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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 981540-CA 
v. : 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals a final order of dismissal in a prosecution for possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996). The information was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the 
trial court's order suppressing evidence which rendered the State unable to proceed. See 
State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). The State's appeal is proper under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (1995 & Supp. 1998). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND PRESERVED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1(a). Did the trial court clearly err in finding that the only purpose for the traffic 
stop was Trooper Wilson's assumption that defendant had violated Wyoming law 
requiring the permanent display of both a rear and front plate? 
1(b). If so, did the trial court further err in concluding that the trooper therefore 
lacked reasonable suspicion to effect the stop? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to these issues. The trial court's underlying 
fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The trial 
court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some 
"measure of discretion" as regards the application of legal standards to the facts. See 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
These issues were preserved below (R. 47-41; R. 50-48; R. 61-59; R. 62).* 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996) (R. 2-1). 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search of his 
*The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
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vehicle (R. 20-29 (motion); R. 32-22 (memorandum) R. 58-51 (reply memorandum) 
(copies are contained in addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing held on 26 
February 1998 (R. 75) (a copy of the suppression hearing transcript is contained in 
addendum C), the trial court granted defendant's motion (R. 50-48) (a copy of the 
Memorandum Decision is contained in addendum D). The State moved to reconsider the 
suppression ruling (R. 61-60) (a copy of the motion is contained in addendum B), but the 
trial court denied the State's motion (R. 62) (a copy of the Memorandum Decision is 
contained in addendum D). Because the State was unable to proceed without the 
suppressed evidence, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the above charge (R. 68-67). 
The State filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 70). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Suspicion of a Registration Violation and/or Stolen Vehicle 
On 20 October 1997, Trooper Wilson of the Utah Highway Patrol observed 
defendant's vehicle traveling northbound on 1-15 with no front license plate (R. 75: 3-4), 
add. C.2 Suspecting a registration violation and/or a possible stolen vehicle the trooper 
effected a traffic stop and in the process observed a Wyoming license plate on the rear of 
2Only the first page of the suppression hearing transcript is numbered in the record 
on appeal and its subsequent pages retain their original numbering. Therefore, transcript 
pages will be cited in this brief as "(R. [record number]: [internal page number]).'1 
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defendant's vehicle3 (R. 75: 3-4, 20, 26-27), add. C. In the trooper's experience, a license 
plate irregularity such as a missing front plate can indicate improper registration and/or a 
stolen vehicle; therefore, the presence of a rear license plate did not allay the trooper's 
suspicions (R. 75: 24), add. C. 
Suspicion of Drug Trafficking 
As the trooper spoke with defendant, the driver, the trooper saw the front license 
plate resting on the dash of the car and detected an odor of marijuana coming from the 
open driver's side window (R. 75: 5-6), add. C. He also noticed a sprig of sage or juniper 
hanging on the rear view mirror (id). In the trooper's experience, sage and juniper are 
commonly used to mask the smell of the marijuana (id). 
For safety purposes, the trooper asked defendant to exit the car and accompany 
him back to the patrol vehicle (R. 75: 7), add. C. There, defendant provided a valid 
driver's license and vehicle registration (R. 75: 9), add. C.4 The trooper told defendant 
that because he was from out-of-state, the trooper would issue a warning for the improper 
3See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-404 (1993) ("License plates issued for a vehicle 
other than a motorcycle, trailer, or semitrailer shall be attached to the vehicle, one in the 
front and the other in the rear"); Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) (1993) ("It is a class C 
misdemeanor to operate upon any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to be 
registered without having the license plate or plates securely attached . . . " ) . 
4Neither defendant nor his passenger codefendant Sultan were the registered owner 
of the car, but codefendant had permission to take the vehicle (R. 75: 8-9). 
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license plate display (R. 75: 7), add. C.5 
Consent to Search 
The trooper also explained to defendant that he detected the odor of marijuana 
coming from the front of the car and requested permission to search that area (R. 75: 8), 
add. C. The trooper further explained that if he did not find anything upon searching the 
front of the car he would not look in other areas (id). Defendant consented to the 
requested search stating, "If you have to" (R. 75: 9), add. C. The trooper finished writing 
the warning citation and returned defendant's papers (id). 
Trooper Wilson next approached codefendant and informed him that he could 
smell marijuana coming from the vehicle and that defendant had given him permission to 
check the front seat area (id.). The trooper then asked codefendant if the search was 
"okay" with him (id.). Codefendant said, "Yes" (id.). 
Marijuana Seed Husks and Packaged Marijuana Found 
In searching the front of the car, the trooper found what appeared to be the outer 
shell or husk of a marijuana seed on the floor of the passenger side of the car and another 
seed husk on the driver's side of the car, between the door frame and seat (R. 75: 10-11), 
add. C. Upon finding the suspected marijuana seed husks, Trooper Wilson informed 
5The trooper observed that he did not know if defendant "had recently wrecked on 
the trip[, b]ut the reason for the license plate being on the dash was the fact that front 
plastic bumper where the license plate would be secured was damaged (R. 75: 7-8). 
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defendant and codefendant that he suspected he had found marijuana and that he would 
therefore search the rest of the vehicle (R. 75: 11-12), add. C. The trooper then searched 
three suitcases in the trunk area, one of which was found to contain approximately 12 
pounds of marijuana: 
The third bag, which I was told was dirty laundry, the first thing I did is I 
pushed on it. It was a very solid bag. It didn't feel like laundry would feel. 
I found in it what appears to be marijuana wrapped in clear cellophane. It 
was surrounded by detergent or scented dryer sheets. 
(R.75: 12), add. C. 
Motion to Suppress 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized on three grounds. Specifically, 
defendant claimed that the stop was illegal on the ground that out-of-state drivers are not 
subject to Utah's Motor Vehicle Act (R. 19, 29-26), add. A, that the faint smell of 
marijuana did not justify his detention beyond the traffic purpose of the stop (R. 19, 25-
24), add. A, and that his consent to search was invalid, and was insufficiently attenuated 
from the alleged illegal stop (R. 24-23), add. A. 
The State responded that the motor vehicle code did not exempt vehicles licensed 
in other jurisdictions and therefore that the trooper reasonably suspected an equipment 
violation (R. 45-44) (a copy is contained in addendum B), that the smell of marijuana 
constituted at least reasonable suspicion to detain defendant (R. 43), add. B, and that 
defendant's consent to search was knowingly and voluntarily given (R. 43-44), add. B. 
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Defendant filed a reply to the State's memorandum, arguing that the traffic stop of 
an out-of-state vehicle for a violation of the motor vehicle code violated the Commerce 
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the federal constitution (R. 57, 54), 
add. A. According to defendant it was not "practicable or reasonable" to require vehicle's 
registered in another state to comply with Utah's requirements regarding rear and front 
license plate display (R. 53), add. A. Defendant argued that once the trooper observed the 
Wyoming plate on the rear of his vehicle, the traffic stop was unjustified in the absence of 
a reasonable suspicion another crime was being committed (R. 52), add. A. 
Ruling 
The trial court accepted defendant's argument that the initial stop was improper: 
In this case, Officer Wilson testified at the preliminary hearing that the only 
reason he stopped Defendant was because of the missing front plate. He 
admitted that he wasn't sure whether vehicles registered in Wyoming were 
required to display front plates. He 'assumed' they were because he had 
observed other Wyoming vehicles with front plates. The officer's 
'assumption' does not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was 
engaged in criminal activity. A number of lawful reasons could have 
existed to explain the absence of a front plate - one being Wyoming law 
does not require them. 
(R. 49), add. D. 
In so ruling, the trial court rejected the State's argument that Utah's Motor Vehicle 
Code applied to vehicles registered in other jurisdictions but operated on Utah highways: 
The State cites Utah Code Annotated § 41-1 A-1305. That section provides 
that it is a Class ' C Misdemeanor for any person to 'operate on any 
highway of this state any vehicle required by law to be registered without 
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having license plates or plate securely attached.' The State argues that the 
Statute does not exempt vehicles licensed in other jurisdictions. Assuming 
the State's interpretation of the statute is correct, that does not cure the 
officer's 'assumption' of Wyoming's license plate requirement. The officer 
noticed Defendant's vehicle was registered in Wyoming before he pulled 
him over. At that time, the officer did not know whether Wyoming vehicles 
were required to display both front and rear license plates. Clearly, the 
officer cannot enforce a law that he merely 'assumed' existed. Officer 
Wilson should have discontinued his pursuit of Defendant and allowed him 
to proceed without interruption. 
(id). 
Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that the smell of marijuana "may" have 
justified defendant's detention beyond the traffic purpose of the stop, but found that 
because the initial stop was invalid, Trooper Wilson lacked grounds to further detain 
defendant (R. 48), add. D. Finally, the trial court found that the illegal stop "negate[d] 
any subsequent consent to search" (id). 
The prosecutor filed a motion to reconsider the ruling based on defendant's 
stipulation that Wyoming does in fact require display of both a rear and front license plate 
(R. 61-60; R. 59), add. D. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, noting 
that defendant's stipulation as to Wyoming law had "no bearing" on its suppression ruling 
"since it does not change the fact that the officer assumed and did not know that 
Wyoming requires two license plates" (R. 62), add. D. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's factual findings regarding the purpose of the traffic stop are 
incomplete and therefore misrepresent Trooper Wilson's uncontradicted testimony. The 
trial court overlooked Trooper Wilson's testimony that he believed the missing front 
license plate not only violated Wyoming law, but that it was also indicative of an 
improperly registered and/or stolen vehicle. The trial court's incomplete factual findings 
drove its further erroneous legal conclusion that the traffic stop was improper merely 
because Trooper Wilson "assumed," but was not absolutely certain that Wyoming 
requires both a rear and front license plate display. 
Having found the initial traffic stop invalid, the trial court acknowledged that the 
smell of marijuana may have justified defendant's further detention. Indeed, assuming 
the validity of the traffic stop, the smell of marijuana and masking agent coming from the 
vehicle justify not only defendant's further detention, but the subsequent warrantless 
search of the vehicle. An additional ground for upholding the warrantless vehicle search 
is defendant's consent. Defendant minimally challenged the voluntariness of his consent 
below and the trial court did not address the issue other than to hold the consent was 
insufficiently attenuated from the invalid traffic stop. Should the Court therefore agree 
with the State that the initial stop was justified, neither the detention nor the consent is 
tainted and the case should be remanded for trial on the merits. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRAFFIC STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS 
JUSTIFIED PURSUANT TO TROOPER WILSON'S REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OF A REGISTRATION VIOLATION WHICH ALSO 
SUGGESTED A POSSIBLE STOLEN VEHICLE 
1. Clearly Erroneous Factual Finding Regarding Purpose of 
Traffic Stop 
The trial court's factual finding that the only purpose for the traffic stop was the 
trooper's assumption that defendant's vehicle was in violation of Wyoming law is clearly 
erroneous (see R. 50), add. D. Because an appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must 
marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show that evidence 
to be insufficient, State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 
1383 (Utah 1991), the evidence supporting the trial court's clearly erroneous finding is set 
forth below. 
Trooper Wilson's testimony supports the trial court's finding as far as it goes {see 
R. 75: 4, 19-27), add. C. However, in narrowly focusing only on Trooper Wilson's 
assumption, based on his experience, that defendant's vehicle was being operated in 
violation of Wyoming law, the trial court overlooked the trooper's further testimony that 
failing to properly display a front license plate can indicate improper registration and 
therefore a potentially unsafe vehicle, or even a stolen vehicle (id.). The trial court's 
findings are therefore incorrect, incomplete and misrepresent the totality of Trooper 
Wilson's uncontradicted testimony. The trial court obviously accepted the trooper's 
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testimony, having entered no contrary finding. The trial court thus clearly erred in 
overlooking evidence that the trooper suspected the vehicle was not properly registered, 
or possibly stolen. 
2. Minimal Objective Justification for Traffic Stop 
Due to its erroneous finding regarding the purpose for the traffic stop, the trial 
court further erred in concluding the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. 
There is reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop if, from the facts and the 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, police would reasonably suspect that criminal 
activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 
667 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 834 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, the 
reasonable suspicion standard is "less demanding" than probable cause, requiring only 
"'some minimal level of objective justification5" for the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotations omitted). Accord State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 
537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective facts 
suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal activity"). In evaluating this 
minimal objective justification, a court must consider "the totality of the circumstances — 
the whole picture." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). As the Supreme 
Court notes: 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain 
11 
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as 
factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law 
enforcement officers. 
Id. at 418. 
Under these established principals, a stop based on reasonable suspicion may serve 
not merely to seize criminals, but also to dispel suspicion and prevent criminal activity. 
See, e.g., Terry\ 392 U.S. at 22 (limited detentions supported by interest in "effective 
crime prevention and detection"); State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989) 
(same). Consequently, there remains the very real chance that many such stops will 
reveal no criminality. That possibility, however, does not preclude police from 
investigating facts that would warrant a person of "reasonable caution" in taking action. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. See also Menke, 787 P.2d at 540-41 (recognizing police "duty to 
make observations and investigations to determine whether the law is being violated"); 
Holmes, 11A P.2d at 508 (same). Moreover, police are "'entitled to assess the facts in 
light of their experience.9" Holmes, 11A P.2d at 508 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, All U.S. 873, 885 (1975)). That a suspect's conduct may be consistent with 
innocent behavior does not therefore vitiate the reasonable suspicion of an experienced 
officer: "To the contrary, where a defendant's conduct is 'conceivably consistent with 
innocent... activity,' but is also 'strongly indicative' of criminal activity, [this Court] 
will not hesitate to conclude that reasonable suspicion exists." Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 
861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993). 
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Based on his observations of other Wyoming vehicles, Trooper Wilson assumed 
but did not know with absolute certainty that Wyoming required both rear and front 
license plate display (R. 49), add. D. Based on his, as it turns out, correct assumption (see 
R. 59), add. B, the trooper believed the missing front plate indicated improper registration 
and/or a stolen vehicle (R. 75: 4, 19-27), add. C. The trooper's correct assumption of 
Wyoming law supports the reasonableness of his suspicions about defendant's car. 
Indeed, if the trooper had believed that Wyoming law did not require display of a front 
license plate, he could not have reasonably suspected, without more, that the missing 
plate required further investigation for a possible improper registration and/or stolen 
vehicle. 
Therefore, based on his familiarity with Wyoming cars displaying both front and 
rear license plates, Trooper Wilson had at least a minimal objective justification for the 
traffic stop when he observed defendant's vehicle without a front Wyoming plate. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. Moreover, contrary to the trial court's 
erroneous reasoning, the trooper's experienced suspicions were not vitiated by any 
possible "lawful reason[]" for the missing front plate (R. 49), add. D. See Spotts, 861 
P.2d at 440 (recognizing that existence of an innocent explanation does not vitiate 
reasonable suspicion). 
It is on this ground that the instant case is distinguishable from State v. Baird, 763 
P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988), where the Court invalidated a traffic stop on the ground it 
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was based on nothing more than the trooper's "idle curiosity" about the color of the 
sticker on the out-of-state license plate. State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 n. 3 (Utah 
App. 1992) (distinguishing Baird). Indeed, this case is more like Naisbitt, where the 
trooper stopped a vehicle with no license plates to determine if the paper in the back 
window was a valid temporary registration permit. Id. Unlike the trooper in Baird who 
stopped Baird's vehicle because "something just struck [him] funny about [the sticker]," 
Trooper Wilson, like the trooper in Naisbitt, "had a properly articulable basis" for the 
traffic stop that went "beyond idle curiosity." 827 P.2d at 971. Indeed, Trooper Wilson 
was concerned defendant's vehicle was not properly registered. See State v. Harmon, 910 
P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 1995) (recognizing "genuine public safety concern[]" presented by 
operation of uninsured vehicles). See also People v. Glick, 250 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (Cal. 
App. 1988) (validating traffic stop for failure to display current registration tag on out-of-
state license plate, recognizing police have a duty to ensure both in-state and out-of-state 
vehicles are "fit" for operation and that registration and inspection requirements are 
designed to keep dangerous cars off the highways). The trooper was also legitimately 
concerned the vehicle may be stolen. See People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 844 (Cal. 1972) (recognizing that lack of a license plate is 
"highly suspicious," that it is a "matter of common knowledge that automobile thieves 
often switch license plates from one car to another in order to conceal the identity of the 
stolen vehicle," and concluding that police may reasonably suspect vehicle with missing 
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or improperly attached license plates is stolen). See also Mack v. State, 859 P.2d 526, 
527 (Tex. App. 1993); People v. Gordon, 561 N.E.2d 1164, 1165 (111. App. 1990), appeal 
denied, 567 N.E.2d 336 (111. 1991) (missing front license plate gives rise to suspicion of 
stolen vehicle). 
The trial court's ruling misapprehends the uncontradicted facts and the pertinent 
legal standard. It should therefore be overruled. 
3. Detention Beyond Any Traffic Purpose Justified by Smell 
of Marijuana 
Assuming the Court agrees that the instant traffic stop was justified, defendant's 
detention beyond any traffic purpose of the stop was valid. Indeed, the trial court 
correctly acknowledged that if the initial traffic stop was valid, defendant's detention was 
further justified by the smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle when Trooper 
Wilson first made contact with him (R. 48), add. D. See Naisbitt, 827 P.2d at 972 
recognizing that the ,fodor of marijuana gives an officer justification to search a vehicle, 
even absent a warrant or some other exception to the warrant requirement, such as 
consent'1).6 
6The smell of juniper and sage branches hanging from defendant's rear view 
mirror also emanated from the vehicle, scents which in the trooper's experience are used 
to mask the odor of marijuana (R. 75: 6), add. C. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 76 
F.3d 1114, 1116-1117 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding detention based in part on strong odor 
of air freshener coming from vehicle). 
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4. Warrantless Vehicle Search Justified Pursuant to Smell of 
Marijuana and/or Defendant's Consent 
Having found the initial traffic stop invalid, the trial court did not consider the 
propriety of the warrantless vehicle search other than to hold any consent was "negate[d]H 
by, or insufficiently attenuated from the preceding illegal stop (R. 48), add. D. Thus, 
assuming the validity of the initial traffic stop, the warrantless search of defendant's 
vehicle was otherwise justified not only by the smell of marijuana and masking agent 
coming from the vehicle, Naisbitt, 827 P.2d at 972; Castillo, 76 F.3d at 1116-1117, but 
defendant's consent to search as well. Ohio v. Robinette, U.S. , 117 S.Ct. 417, 
421 (1996); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 899 P.2d 
1231 (Utah 1995).7 
7Defendant minimally challenged the voluntariness of his consent to search below, 
focusing instead on the taint from the alleged improper traffic stop (R. 24-23), add. A. 
The record indicates Trooper Wilson merely requested permission to search and that he 
used no improper claim of authority, show of force, or deception (R. 75: 8-9), add. C. See 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Defendant and codefendant Sultan 
both gave their consent and were otherwise cooperative (R. 75: 8-9), add. C. See 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106. While codefendant Sultan testified that Trooper Wilson 
asked defendant for consent to search, but not him (R. 75: 39), add. C, defendant raised 
no issue regarding Sultan's testimony below. Therefore, assuming the Court agrees with 
the State regarding the validity of the initial traffic stop, there is no need to remand for 
findings on the validity of defendant's untainted consent. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court should reverse the trial court's suppression of 
evidence and remand this case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on [4 January 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
^^kJ^fc^X^__ 
AN DECKER 
ssistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on /^January 1999,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North 
Provo,Utah 84606 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No.971400205 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN : 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr. 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the defendant, CLARK ROY FRIESEN, by and through his 
attorney, and hereby moves this Court for an order suppressing all evidence 
obtained by a search of the vehicle operated by the defendant. Defendant was 
operating a vehicle which was properly registered in the state of Wyoming. The 
1 
grounds for the motion are that the officer stopped the vehicle illegally for an 
equipment violation to which out of state drivers are not subject to, to wit: no front 
plate. Further, the detention of the defendant exceeded that necessary to complete 
the traffic stop. Said stop was nothing more that a pretext stop with no legitimate 
justification or probable cause and the resulting search was conducted in violation of 
the rights of the defendant to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the 
provisions of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
Further, defendant moves for the suppression of the large quantity of 
marijuana found in the bag identified as belonging to the passenger of the vehicle as 
there is not sufficient nexus to the defendant to indicate any ownership, dominion or 
control over said bag or contents by this defendant. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant requests that this matter be set for 
hearing on his motion to suppress prior to the trial of this matter. 
Dated this 13,h day of January, 1998. 
2 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing document to the 
following: 
DAVID O. LEAVITT 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
MILTON HARMON 
Attorney for Defendant Sultan 
36 South Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
this 13th day of January, 1998. 
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MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No.971400205 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN : 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr. 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the defendant, CLARK ROY FRIESEN, by and through his 
attorney, hereby submits this memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
his Motion to Suppress. 
FACTS 
1 
The Court heard evidence in this matter previously. At the hearing, Trooper 
Charlie Wilson testified that he observed the vehicle, operated by the defendant, 
northbound on 1-15, south of Nephi. He could not recall whether he was stationary 
or not at the time he saw the vehicle. The trooper noticed that the vehicle did not 
have a front plate displayed. The trooper at some point pulled behind the vehicle 
and saw that the vehicle had a rear Wyoming license plate. He pulled the vehicle 
over. The trooper was clear that the only reason he stopped the vehicle was that the 
vehicle did not display a front plate. The trooper testified that he knew there were 
some states that did not require a front plate and that he was not sure whether or not 
Wyoming required vehicles registered there to display a front plate. He testified 
that he thought Wyoming may have such a requirement since he had seen other 
Wyoming cars display both front and rear plates. 
The trooper testified that as he approached the vehicle, prior to making 
contact with the occupants, he observed the rear plate and noted that the plate was 
current. As he approached the front of the vehicle he noted damage to the front 
bumper and also saw the front plate on the dashboard of the vehicle. 
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Upon making contact with the defendant driver, the trooper was furnished a 
valid driver's license and vehicle registration. At that time he noticed a sprig of 
sage brush or juniper hanging from the mirror and detected what he thought might 
be the smell of either burnt or raw marijuana. The smell was faint and he was not 
positive it was marijuana. He asked the driver back to his patrol car where he 
completed checks on the registration of the vehicle and drivers' license. 
Upon completing those checks the trooper told the driver he wanted to search* 
the front of the vehicle. He indicated that the driver was reluctant to give consent 
and but eventually said "Yes, if you have to." The officer had the passenger get out 
of the vehicle and searched the persons of both defendants for weapons, finding 
nothing. The trooper then searched the front area of the vehicle finding two 
particles which he identified as marijuana. He then searched the rear of the vehicle 
and found marijuana in a bag belonging to the co-defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE INITIAL STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS NOT BASED 
UPON A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE OCCUPANTS HAD 
COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF UTAH LAW OR A TRAFFIC 
3 
VIOLATION AND WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A police officer may not stop or detain a driver and occupants of a motor 
vehicle unless he has reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a violation 
of Utah law. The officer may stop for a minor traffic offense or equipment violation 
only for so long as is necessary to complete the purpose of that stop. State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
It is the defendant's position that a violation of the registration requirements 
of the state of Utah requiring vehicles registered in Utah to display a front license 
plate does not apply to nonresidents. The failure to display a front plate is not a 
factor which would provide "reasonable suspicion" necessary to detain the vehicle 
once the officer has determined that the vehicle is registered in another state. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-201, et. seq., sets forth the requirements for 
veliicles operating on the highways of this state and the registration requirements for 
said vehicles. Section 41-la-202(2) provides that registration is not required in this 
state for any vehicle which is registered in another state and owned by a 
nonresident. U.C.A. Section 41-la-401, et. seq., sets forth the requirements of 
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license plates issued to owners of vehicles registered in this state. In Section 41-la-
404, the location of plates for vehicles registered in this state requires one rear plate 
and a front plate. U.C.A. Section 41-la-1305(5) provides that it is a Class C 
misdemeanor for a person to : 
operate on any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to be 
registered without having license plate or plates securely 
attached....(emphasis added) 
Defendant maintains that it is not against the law of the state of Utah for the 
defendant to operate a vehicle registered in another state without a front plate. 
Defendant submits that, based upon the foregoing, he was not violating any 
applicable traffic laws or other laws of this state for which the officer could stop and 
detain his vehicle. Once the officer had determined that the vehicle was a 
nonresident vehicle, unless he had observed something further upon which he could 
justify a "reasonable suspicion" a crime was being committed, his further detention 
was unconstitutional. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 
The Utah Court of Appeals considered a similar regarding nonresident 
vehicles stopped because the Utah highway patrol trooper claimed the sticker color 
5 
displayed on the license plate, although showing the current year, had a "peculiar" 
color. In State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Ct. App. 1988), Trooper Mangelson of the 
Utah Highway Patrol stopped a vehicle registered in Arizona because the sticker on 
the rear license plate did not appear to be valid. Although the trooper admitted he 
did was unaware of the Arizona color scheme for stickers, he followed the car to 
determine if the year was valid. Upon inspection, he determined that the sticker was 
valid. After stopping the vehicle the trooper made other observations which 
included the smell of marijuana. The court of appeals held that there was no 
articulable suspicion to justify the stop and the evidence obtained against the 
defendant was a result of the exploitation of the impermissible stop. In Footnote 1 
to the opinion of the court, the court stated "If this is sufficient reason to stop, every 
out-of-state vehicle may be stopped for no reason other than the officer's ignorance 
of the license plate sticker code." 
In the present case, Trooper Wilson admitted that some states do not require 
a vehicle to display a front plate, and, although he thought that Wyoming issued 
front plates, he did not know whether or not it was required to display a front plate 
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in Wyoming. (Based upon the facts of this case it is not necessary to address the 
issue which would be raised if evidence had been submitted which proved Wyoming 
had a requirement that a front plate be displayed. That factual situation would raise 
the issue of a law enforcement officer of one state being able to enforce the 
regulatory laws of another state.) 
The same unreasonable scenario of a Utah law enforcement officer being able 
to stop every out-of-state vehicle which did not display a front plate would result 
from a finding that a violation of Utah's registration and plate display requirements 
is justification to stop an out-of-state vehicle. 
However, even should the initial stop be considered to be valid until the 
trooper determined the plate to be current, the further detention of the defendant 
which resulted in the obtaining of additional evidence was unconstitutional. Since 
Trooper Wilson admitted that at some point prior to contacting the driver he 
ascertained that the vehicle had a proper Wyoming plate, his detention from that 
point on was unreasonable and unjustified. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491; State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991); State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 
7 
(Utah 1996). 
POINT II: THE TROOPER'S SMELLING WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT 
BE EITHER BURNT OR RAW MARIJUANA DID NOT JUSTIFY 
FURTHER DETENTION UNDER THE "PLAIN SMELL" EXCEPTION. 
Defendant also asserts that even should the court determine the stop to be 
valid, the further detention and search based upon the smell of marijuana was not 
justified. The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, recognized 
that the strong smell of marijuana may give probable cause for the search of a 
vehicle. The Court cited United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1984, 
that a "strong, emanating odor of marijuana comes within the 'plain view' doctrine 
and need not be ignored by officers." 744 F.2d at 380. The cases which have 
allowed the smell of marijuana to provide the basis of searches have required that 
the odor be "strong"(£/.S. v. Hanie, 637 F.2d 227, U.S. v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208 
(10th Cir. 1986), "distinct"(£/.S. v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297(10th Cir. 1991), U.S. v. 
Merryman, 630 F.2d 780 (10,h Cir. 1980), or "intense and emanating" (U.S. v. 
Haley, 669 F.2d 201 (4th Cir.). 
The troopers detection of the "possible" smell of either burnt or raw 
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marijuana was not obvious, distinctive, strong, intense, nor did it "emanate" from 
the vehicle. The trooper testified that there is a definite difference between the 
smell of burnt marijuana and raw marijuana but that he could not discern the 
difference in his contact at the door of the vehicle. Defendant submits that the 
indication of possible smell of marijuana observed by the officer in this case does 
not meet the level necessary to justify probable cause. This conclusion is also 
supported by the officer's account of his conduct with the defendant. Instead of 
relying upon the smell of marijuana as the basis to search the automobile, the 
trooper requested permission from the defendant to search just the front of the 
vehicle and indicated that the defendant reluctantly, said "If you have to." The 
trooper did not testify that he smelled the marijuana stronger once he had his head 
clear inside the vehicle. 
POINT III: ANY CONSENT GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT FOR THE 
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED 
FROM THE ILLEGAL DETENTION. 
Trooper Wilson testified that after he had the defendant in his patrol car, he 
told him he wanted to look in the front seat of the vehicle, the defendant hesitated 
9 
and then said "If you have to." That comment is far from consent. The comment is 
not agreement to search, but is conditioned upon whether or not the officer had to 
search. Since the officer did not have to search, the decision was not that the of 
defendant under that comment, but that of the officer. Even if the court were to find 
that the statement of the defendant constitutes a consent the consent is not 
sufficiently attenuated under the standard of State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990), at 690-91, to wit: temporal proximity of the initial illegality and the consent 
in question, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and 
flagrancy of the illegal misconduct; there was not sufficient proof of attenuation. 
Tliere was no time differential between the initial contact of the defendant with the 
trooper or intervening circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant submits that the search of the vehicle 
was unconstitutional and all evidence obtained as a result of the search of the 
vehicle should be suppressed. 
Dated this 13th day of March, 1998. 
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Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document to the 
following: 
DAVID LEAVITT 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
this/> day of March, 1998. 
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MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
Plaintiff, : MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
vs. : Case No.971400205 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN : 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr. 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the defendant, CLARK ROY FRIESEN, by and through his 
attorney, Michael D. Esplin, and hereby submits this reply to the Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence submitted by the state. 
ARGUMENT 
1 
Defendant stands on the authorities and argument cited in his memorandum 
previously submitted on the issues of consent and whether the trooper's smell of 
faint marijuana justified reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle and occupants 
beyond that necessary to complete a traffic stop. Defendant submits additional 
authorities and argument in response to the argument that Utah law enforcement 
officers have the right to stop any out-of-state vehicles which violate Utah's 
equipment and registration requirements. 
Based upon the reasoning upon which the plaintiff relies to justify the 
reasonableness of the initial stop in this case, the law enforcement officers of any 
state could stop and detain drivers and passengers of vehicles legally registered in 
their home states for a number of registration or equipment "violations" of the 
officers' state which may not be violations in the home state. Such stops and 
detentions violate the right of citizens to travel freely across the country and also 
violate the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution. The defendant submits 
that the officer did not have the right to stop the vehicle for a registration violation 
of no front license plate. 
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Such laws as those involving conduct such as speed limits, stop signs and 
traffic regulatory laws are clearly enforceable by the individual law enforcement 
agencies of the state in which a person is traveling. However, registration and 
equipment requirements are in a different category. The registration and equipment 
regulations concerning motor vehicles have been the individual riglit of each state to 
establish for the vehicles registered or licensed in that state. Although the federal 
government has imposed federal regulations and requirements concerning areas of 
manufacturing to ensure the general safety of motor vehicles, the various states have 
the right to enact legislation to amplify the federal regulations. As a result, there are 
many areas which may have some safety relevance in which the laws of individual 
states may vary. For example, states vary on the requirement to display a front 
license plate, the necessity of a license plate light, the amount of tinting allowed in 
windows, the size and type of mud flaps and the types of vehicles required to be 
equipped with mud flaps, the amount of clearance the front and rear bumper must 
have from the road surface, muffler requirements, etc. 
The states have made some effort to standardize motor vehicle safety 
3 
equipment laws in the areas not preempted by the federal government. Utah has 
enacted U.C.A. Section 41-15-1, et. seq., Vehicle Safety Equipment Compact, was 
passed by compact states to promote uniformity in safety requirements and 
equipment. The reason the law was passed was to ensure that vehicles licensed in 
compact states had some uniformity as to safety equipment. The act does not have 
any enforcement teeth or penalties. The suggestions of the commission set up by 
the act to review and recommend equipment standards can only make suggestions. 
The legislatures of those states who are compact members must individually enact 
the equipment regulations which they decide are appropriate. Utah law enforcement 
officers are not empowered by the act to enforce the laws which other compact 
states have adopted even though Utah may have passed similar equipment 
requirements. 
Many states do not have a requirement that vehicles registered and licensed in 
the state display two license plates. The officer indicated that he was aware of that 
fact and also that he was not sure whether or not Wyoming required two plates to be 
displayed on vehicles licensed there. The issue of the reasonableness of the stop or 
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the very right to impede or delay vehicles which do not comply with a particular 
state's registration, licensing or equipment laws has previously been considered and 
determined by the United States Supreme Court. 
Citizens of this country have a long-standing constitutional right to travel 
freely tlirough the different states under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV of the Federal Constitution. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall, at 180,19 L 
Ed357; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall 418, 20 L Ed 449 (1871); United States v. 
Wheeler, 254 US 281 (1920). This protection insures the interstate traveler against 
the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 
US 55 (1982). The right includes "free ingress" and "egress" tlirough a state. 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 US 385 (1948). Additionally, the application of Utah's 
registration requirements to out-of-state vehicles traveling into this state violates the 
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. While the various states have 
authority to regulate travel into and through the state, they may not place restrictions 
or requirements upon vehicles traveling on state roadways which are unreasonable. 
In Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines, 359 US 520,3 L Ed2d 1003 (1959), an 
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Illinois statute requiring mud flaps of a certain type was found to violate the 
commerce clause. The court determined that with only two possible exceptions, 
states which had mud flap requirements had requirements which would not meet the 
requirements of the Illinois statute. This is clearly the situation in regard to the front 
license plate requirement of Utah. As set forth above, many states do not have the 
requirement of a front plate. 
Although the court found that there were added safety benefits from the type 
of mud flap required by Illinois, the court felt that the cost and inconvenience to 
those traveling in interstate commerce to be more persuasive. 
The same argument is applicable to the present case involving the 
enforcement of Utah's front license plate requirement as enforced on out-of-state 
vehicles. It clearly violates the ruling of the court in the Bibb case and for the same 
reasons. It is not practicable or reasonable to require compliance by a driver of a 
vehicle with the various plate display requirements of each state in which the driver 
may pass through. If the vehicle was from a state which did not issue a front plate, 
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the driver of a vehicle registered in that state would be subject to stop in every state 
which required it's residents to display a front plate. 
Defendant submits that, based upon the foregoing, he was not violating any 
applicable traffic laws or other laws of this state for which the officer could stop and 
detain his vehicle. Once the officer had determined that the vehicle was a 
nonresident vehicle, unless he had observed something further upon which he could 
justify a "reasonable suspicion" a crime was being committed, his further detention 
was unconstitutional. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant submits the stop and detention of the 
defendant was not justified and the resulting search was unconstitutional. 
Dated this/^day of June, 1998. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document to the 
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following: 
DAVID O. LEAVITT 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
this _^Lday of June, 1998. 
m ^ ^ ^ 
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Addendum B 
David 0. Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
Plaintiff, TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
vs. 
Criminal No. C1lH-j /'JCLC?> 
HEATH C. SULTAN 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN 
Defendants. 
The State of Utah hereby submits the following memorandum in opposition to 
defendants' Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Monday, October 20,1997, Trooper Charlie Wilson of the Utah Highway Patrol 
stopped the Defendants' vehicle for the violation of no front license plate. The officer made 
contact with the driver. As he did so, he detected a brief odor of marijuana. He also noticed a 
small sprig of sage or juniper hanging on the rear view mirror. 
The officer had the driver exit the vehicle and he told the driver that he had smelled the 
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\ T • 7F OF L'TAM 
S3KCT28 f H 2 : 5 l ^ 
1 
faint odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. The officer asked consent to search the front 
seat area of the vehicle for marijuana. The driver hesitated, and then said "yes, if you have to." 
The officer told the driver that he would just look in the front seat area, and that if he didn't find 
anything in the immediate area of the front seat and floor that he wouldn't check any further. 
The driver then said "Go ahead and check, there's no marijuana in there." 
The officer informed the passenger that he could smell marijuana coming from the 
vehicle. The officer also told the passenger that the driver had consented to a search of the front 
of the vehicle and asked him if that was alright with him. The passenger indicated that it was 
fine. The officer patted down the occupants and then began searching the front of the car. In the 
front floor area, the officer found a small fragment of what looked like burnt marijuana. 
Additionally, on the floor by the left side of the driver's seat the officer found another small 
fragment of what looked like burnt marijuana. Officer Wilson is a trooper with over twenty 
years experience and has seen small quantities of marijuana on many occasions. 
The officer showed the fragment of what looked like burnt marijuana residue to the two 
occupants, and told them that based on that, he was going to check through the rest of the 
vehicle. The officer opened the back of the vehicle and saw three small travel bags. The driver 
claimed one, the passenger claimed the other. The third bag bore the name of Defendant Sultan 
and was claimed by each Defendant. In the third bag, the officer found twelve pounds of 
marijuana. 
The officer arrested the Defendants for possession of marijuana with the intent to 
2 
distribute. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE VEHICLE. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-1A-1305 (5) provides that it is a Class "C" 
misdemeanor for a person to "operate on any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to 
be registered without having license plate or plates securely attached." The defense suggests that 
the defendant did not violate the law by not having his front license plate securely attached 
because his vehicle was not required to be registered in the State of Utah. The State concedes 
that the defendant need not have his car licensed in the State of Utah to drive on the highways of 
this state. However, the statute does not exempt vehicle licensed in other jurisdictions to have 
their license plates securely attached. The statute states that "any vehicle required by law to be 
registered". The phrase "any vehicle required by law" certainly implies that vehicles required by 
Wyoming law to be registered or any other state law which fit into the vehicle's regulated by this 
statute. 
The issue as to whether an out-of-state vehicle is required by 41-la-1305(5) to have a 
front plate is resolved by adhering to common rules for statutory construction. The Utah 
Supreme Count in Brinkerhoffvs. Forsyth, 79 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah, 1989) stated "where statutory 
language is plain and unambiguous, this court will not look beyond the same to define legislative 
intent. Rather we are guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed according to 
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its plain language." The plain language of Section 41-la-1305(5) U.C.A. sets forth that any 
vehicle that is required by law. Since the statute does not specifically specify that the vehicle 
must be required by Utah law to be registered, this court ought to interpret the statute as meaning 
any law which requires a vehicle to be registered. This corresponds with what the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated in Allred vs. Utah State Retirement Board, 914 P.2d 1172,1175 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) when it held "unless statutory language is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant 
contradiction to the express purpose of the statute, this court applies the statute's literal 
wording.*' 
Since the defendant was required by Utah law to have a front plate on his vehicle, the 
trooper had reasonable suspicion that a violation of Utah law was occurring when he witnessed 
the defendant traveling down the freeway without a front plate on his trailer. 
The defense attempts to compare the incident case to State vs. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 
(App. Ct. 1998). In Baird the Utah Highway patrol trooper stopped the vehicle after determining 
that the registration sticker was valid because "something just struck him funny about it". The 
Court of Appeals held in Baird that there was no articulable suspicion to justify the stop based on 
those facts. The defense attempts to state that Trooper Wilson pulled the vehicle over because he 
was unaware of Wyoming's front plate laws. Such is not the case. Trooper Wilson pulled the 
defendant over because the defendant was violating Utah law which required that vehicles 
registered in Wyoming must have front plates in Utah based upon Section 41-la-1305(5) and 41-
la-404. 
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2. THE TROOPER'S SMELLING THE FAINT SMELL OF MARIJUANA GAVE 
HIM REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONTINUE TO DETENTION TO ASK 
CONSENT TO SEARCH. 
The State does not assert that the trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle based 
upon the faint smell of marijuana. The State believes that if the strong smell of marijuana 
emanating from a vehicle falls within the plain view doctrine, thus giving probable cause to 
search the vehicle, that a less strong smell of marijuana or a faint smell gives the officer. The 
lower standard of reasonable suspicion to continue the detention. The standard for reasonable 
suspicion is set forth in State vs. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah, 1995). When the Court stated 
"when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to 
be engaged in criminal activity." Clearly the faint smell of marijuana gives rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that there is marijuana in the car, or that the defendant has smoked marijuana. Under 
either scenario, the officer has grounds to ask a few questions regarding that suspicion. For that 
reason, the continued detention to ask consent to search of the vehicle is permissible. 
3. THE OFFICER RECEIVED CONSENT TO SEARCH, 
State vs. Whittenback 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah, 1980) sets forth some of the criteria that 
the court ought to consider in determining whether consent was voluntarily granted. Those 
criteria include: First, the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officer; Second, the 
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; Third, a mere request to search; Fourth, 
5 
cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and Fifth, the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer." Id. 
In this case, Trooper Wilson complied completely with the standards set forth in 
Whittenback. He used no claim of authority to search, he exhibited no force. Furthermore, his 
request was a mere request to search the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle cooperated with him. 
The officer did nothing to trick or deceive the owner. In fact, the officer promised the defendant 
that he would not search the vehicle unless he found something evidencing marijuana in the front 
of the vehicle. 
When Trooper Wilson found the small pieces of marijuana in the vehicle, he then had 
probable cause to search the remaining portion of the vehicle. The fact that the pieces of 
marijuana were small is immaterial. Officer Wilson testified that he is an officer of over twenty 
years and that he is very familiar with marijuana. As the Supreme Court held in State vs. Dorsey, 
731 P.2d 1085 (Utah, 1985). The question of the legality of a detention or search depends on the 
objective facts in light of the officer's training and experience. Id. Officer Wilson was 
competent to tell that the small fragments were marijuana - therefore, he had probable cause. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reason that the trooper had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, that his 
extended detention was lawful, and that the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress ought to be denied. 
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Dated this 0 ^ day of May, 1998. 
EteVufO. Leavitt 
Juab County Attorney 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence to Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant, 43 East 
200 North, P. O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603-0200 on this J>£^C day of May, 1998. 
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BY 
7 
David O. Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
Plaintiff, SUPPRESSION AND TO SUPPLEMENT 
THE RECORD 
vs. 
Criminal No. 971400205 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN 971400204 
HEATH C. SULTAN, 
Defendants. 
The State of Utah, through the Juab County Attorney, hereby moves this court to 
reconsider its decision that the trooper's stop was conducted without reasonable suspicion. The 
State still asserts that the officer's main duty is to enforce Utah law and not a Wyoming statute. 
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle 
because he merely assumed that Wyoming required two license plates. That assumption was 
based upon his 24 years of experience on the Utah Highway Patrol and that he had seen 
Wyoming vehicles with two license plates on prior occasions. In fact, Wyoming law does 
prohibit operating a motor vehicle without two license plates. Wyoming Statutes Annotated 31-
\r ;• * ! ^ C T t C C : T . T 
. ".'. 1[ CT ' 'TA ; ; 
S3J'J;:20 FI ; I<:03, 
I 
2-205 states: "(a) license plates for vehicles shall be: (1) conspicuously displayed and securely 
fastened to be plainly visible; (a) one on the front of the vehicle, excluding motorcycles, trailers, 
and vehicles operated with dealer or manufacturer's license, (b) one on the rear of the vehicle." 
The Court ought not require a police officer to have absolute certainty of every law in 
every state when he observes what he reasonably believes is a law violation. 
For that reason, the State requests that the Court reconsider it ruling on the suppression 
hearing and it augments the file of Wyoming statute, prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle 
without a securely fashioned front license plate. 
Dated this fclT^ day of June, 1998. 
D--.R/. -d-
David O. Leavitt 
Juab County Attorney 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration of 
Suppression and to Supplement the Record to Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Clark Friesen, 43 
East 200 North, P. O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603-0200 and Milton T. Harmon, Attorney for 
Heath C. Sultan, 36 South Main, Nephi, Utah 84648 on this J9+h day of June, 1998. 
BY COMsrtJJt// 7%,yJj-*L. 
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David O. Leavitt, No. 5990 
Juab County Attorney 
146 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN 
HEATH C. SULTAN, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AS TO 
WYOMING LAW 
Criminal No. 971400205 
971400240 
Michael D. Esplin, counsel for the defense in this case, hereby stipulates that Wyoming 
statute 31-2-205 of Wyoming Statutes Annotated prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle 
without a securely fastened front license plate. 
Dated this day of June, 1998. 
Michael D. Esplin 
Attorney for Defendants 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 (Electronically Recorded on February 26,1998). 
3 (Recording started; hearing already in progress), 
4 CHARLIE RAY WILSON. 
5 having been called and sworn 
6 testifies as follows: 
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
8 BY MR. LEAVITT: 
9 Q. — drug intradiction? 
10 A. Yes. I have. 
11 Q. Can you tell me what some of that is? 
12 A. The first basic training was in POST that all police officers 
13 go through. And just throughout the years, as my experience as a 
14 trooper. I've had the opportunity with guys that have done a lot in that 
15 field and it's just an ongoing experience and learning. 
16 Q. Have you ever seen marijuana on the job? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. How many times? 
19 A. I don't know the number of times. Probably hundreds of 
20 times. 
21 Q. Uh-huh. Have you ever smelled it? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. An estimation as to how many times that would be? 
24 A. It would be in the hundreds of times. 
25 Q. Okay. Are you familiar with the events of the day of 
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1 October 20th, 1997? 
2 A. Yes. I am. 
3 Q. On that date, did you have occasion to come in contact 
4 with the defendant in this case, Mr. Friesen? 
5 A. I did. 
6 Q. Tell me how that occurred. 
7 A. Okay. I was assigned to work Juab County. We were 
8 south at Nephi. I observed a vehicle going northbound. At this point, I 
9 still can't remember if I was stationary or moving. It seems like I was in 
10 the turn-around. I did not see a front license plate on that vehicle when 
11 it went by me. 
12 Q. Why does that concern you, officer? 
13 A. In Utah, you're issued two license plates and it's 
14 something that we stop on. There's numerous reasons you'd stop on 
15 that. Sometimes if the vehicle only has one license plate, they're only 
16 displaying one, it's a possibility it could be a stolen vehicle, and other 
17 reasons. 
18 Q. Uh-huh. Do you stop out-of-state vehicle for no front 
19 plate? 
20 A. I do when I know that they require two license plates. 
21 Q. Okay. Was it a Wyoming plate? 
22 A. It was a Wyoming license plate. Yes. 
23 Q. Were you familiar with Wyoming law? 
24 A. I know that they issue two license plates. 
25 Q. Okay. What happened when you stopped the vehicle? 
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1 A. As I recall, I drove up past the vehicle to see if it did in fact 
2 have a front license plate. I couldn't see one displayed. The front of 
3 the bumper and grill had been broken where a license plate would go. 
4 I stopped the vehicle. I approached the vehicle and I did 
5 not see that they had a front license plate on the dash until I had 
6 walked up there to talk to the driver. 
7 Q. Who was the driver? 
8 A. I believe it was Mr. Friesen, but I've got to check my 
9 notes. 
10 Q. This defendant? In your reports, do you note the person 
11 in your report is the driver? 
12 A. Just a second. Yes. 
13 Q. Can you tell me who you believe was the driver in that, if 
14 that refreshes your recollection at all? 
15 A. Clark Friesen was the driver. 
16 Q. He was the driver? 
17 A. I'm sorry? 
18 Q. Who was the driver of the vehicle? 
19 A. Mr. Clark Friesen. 
20 MR. LEAVITT: May I approach the witness, your Honor? 
21 THE COURT: You may. 
22 Q. BY MR. LEAVITT: Mr. Friesen was the driver of the 
23 vehicle? 
24 A. To the best of my recollection, it's him that I issued the 
25 warning to, improper license display to. 
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1 Q. Thank you. What happened when you got up to Mr. 
2 Friesen's window? 
3 A. I observed the front license plate or a license plate laying 
4 on the dash. I talked to them about it. I noticed that there was what 
5 appeared to be possibly juniper or cedar branches and sagebrush 
6 hanging from the mirror. At that time, I thought I was picking up an odor 
7 of marijuana. 
8 Q. Could you tell whether it was a burnt or a raw smell or 
9 not? 
10 A. I couldn't tell. 
11 Q. Was it a strong odor or a faint odor? 
12 A. There was different odors in the vehicle and I just thought 
13 that I was picking up an odor of marijuana. And looking at the sage and 
14 cedar hanging from the rearview mirror, this in my experience, people 
15 have put stuff like that to mask the odor of different odors. 
16 Q. How many times have you seen sage or juniper in a car? 
17 A. Several times. 
18 Q. Have any of those times had marijuana? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. They had marijuana in the car? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Have any of them not had marijuana? 
23 A. To the best of my recollection, no. 
24 Q. Every one of them had marijuana? 
25 A. To the best of my recollection. The latest was a stop that 
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1 I assisted Sergeant Mangelson on and they had sagebrush and what 
2 appeared to be cedar branches in the vehicle. 
3 Q. Are you familiar with the smell of sage and juniper? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. How? 
6 A. Just my experience dealing with it and being out in the 
7 country. 
8 Q. Are you able to distinguish the difference between the 
9 smell of sage and juniper versus marijuana? 
10 A. I believe so. 
11 Q. Were the smells that you were smelling distinctly that of 
12 marijuana? 
13 A. I believed it to be marijuana. Yes. 
14 Q. All right. At that point, officer, did the purpose for your 
15 stop change? 
16 A. I became suspicious of the possibility of that, with what I 
17 had witnessed. 
18 Q. Uh-huh. What did you do then? 
19 A. I brought the driver back to my vehicle. 
20 Q. Mr. Friesen? 
21 A. To the best of my recollection, it was Mr. Friesen. 
22 Q. All right. Go ahead. 
23 A. And I told him about the stop. I told him that because he 
24 was out of state, that I would just issue him a warning for improper 
25 license display. I don't know if they had recently wrecked on the trip. 
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1 But, the reason for the license plate being on the dash was the fact that 
2 the front plastic bumper where the license plate would be secured was 
3 damaged. 
4 Q. Uh-huh. Who was the registered owner of the car? 
5 A. It's an individual out of Wyoming. The passenger, Mr. 
6 Sultan, had permission to take the vehicle. 
7 Q. So, Mr. Sultan was the person who had borrowed the 
8 vehicle? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. What else happened when you got back in your vehicle? 
11 A. Because of the odor that I believed that I was smelling, I 
12 asked for consent search to take a look in the vehicle. 
13 Q. Can you tell me specifically what you said to the 
14 defendant? 
15 A. I can't tell you exactly. But it was that I would like to look 
16 in the front part of his vehicle. If I did not find any evidence of 
17 marijuana there, I would restrain my search to the front part of the 
18 vehicle, but if I found anything, then I would search the vehicle. 
19 Q. All right. What was his response? Let me back up and 
20 ask you. Did he appear to understand you? 
21 A. I believe he did. 
22 Q. Did you say this in a threatening way at all? 
23 A. I don't think I was. 
24 Q. All right. Did he consent? 
25 A. He did. 
1 
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Q. 
A. 
vehicle. 
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A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
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What did he say? 
He just gave me consent to look in the front part of the 
Did he hesitate at all? 
May 1 refer to my -
Sure. 
He hesitated and said, "If you have to." 
Okay. What happened after that, officer? 
1 finished writing the driver his warning citation. 
Okay. And then what did you do? 
1 gave back his information to him: his registration and 
driver's license. 
Q. 
this point? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
All right. Did you approach the passenger, Mr. Sultan, at 
Yes. Idid. 
And what did you say to him? 
1 informed him that 1 believed that 1 could smell an odor of 
marijuana coming from the vehicle. And 1 told him that the driver had 
given me consent to check in the front seat area of the vehicle and 
asked him if that was okay with him. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
What was his response? 
He said yes. 
All right. Did you have him exit the vehicle? 
Yes. Idid. 
And did you do a weapon's pat down? 
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1 A. I did. 
2 Q. And then what did you do after that, officer? 
3 A. I made a quick check through the front area of the vehicle. 
4 Q. Did you find anything in the front part of the vehicle that 
5 made you suspicious that there was marijuana in the car? 
6 A. I did. I found what appeared to be the outer shell of a 
7 marijuana seed. 
8 Q. Now, describe what that is, what the outer shell of a 
9 marijuana seed is. 
10 A. It's the rounded husk of a seed. Some seeds don't have a 
11 husk, but this has kind of a shell on the outside of the seed. 
12 Q. And what made you believe that that was a marijuana 
13 husk or marijuana seed? 
14 A In my experience over the years in searching various 
15 vehicles, you tend to find a lot of little marijuana residue like that, litter. 
16 Q. Have you found marijuana seeds or husks of this sort 
17 before? 
18 A. Yes. I have. 
19 Q. Prior to the 20th of October of 1997, do you have an 
20 estimate as to how many times you may have seen those? 
21 A. The seeds and the husks, probably in the hundreds. 
22 Q. Uh-huh. When you saw it, was it something that looked 
23 familiar to you? 
24 A. It appeared to me to look like the shell of a marijuana 
25 seed, the outer husk. 
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1 Q. Now, is this something that's a large item or a small one? 
2 A. It's very small. Possibly as big around as say a BB for a 
3 BB gun. 
4 Q. Uh-huh. 
5 A. But this was just the outer shell of that. 
6 Q. Okay. And what did you do when you found that, officer? 
7 A. I can't remember if I showed it to them right at that time. I 
8 showed it to the guys. 
9 Q. Now, where did you find that specifically? 
10 A. Okay. I found what appeared to be the husks of two 
11 seeds. The first one I found was in the right front in the carpet. The 
12 second one was at the left side of the driver's side down between the 
13 frame and the door seat. 
14 Q. Okay. So, you found two, one on the right side and one 
15 on the left side? 
16 A. Yes. The first one I found was on the right side. The 
17 second one was on the left side. 
18 Q. All right. When you showed these two seeds or husks 
19 to the suspects at this point, did you tell them that you felt like you had 
20 found marijuana? 
21 A. Yes. I did. 
22 Q. Or something indicating marijuana? 
23 A. Yes. 
24- Q. And did you tell them that you were going to check the 
25 rest of the vehicle? 
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1 A. Yes. I did. 
2 Q What happened after that? 
3 A. I had the two individuals stand to the right front of the 
4 vehicle. I had patted them down. I believe I patted them down when I 
5 had the passenger get out of the vehicle. I just asked them to stand 
6 there while I made the search. I told them that based on what I 
7 believed was the marijuana seed residue, that I was going to search the 
8 rest of the vehicle. 
9 I continued to search. I went into the back seat and then 
10 searched the back of the vehicle. The vehicle was a Ford Escort 
11 wagon. So, the luggage was basically visible in the back when you 
12 raised up the back trunk lid. 
13 I searched through several items there. 
14 Q. Did you find any marijuana? 
15 A. I did. 
16 Q. What was it specifically that you found? 
17 A. There was three bags there. I searched the first two. The 
18 third one, I asked what it was. I was told that it was dirty laundry. 
19 Q. And what did you find in the other? 
20 A. The third bag, which I was told was dirty laundry, the 
21 first thing I did is I pushed on it. It was a very solid bag. It didn't feel 
22 like laundry would feel. I found in it what appears to be marijuana 
23 wrapped in clear cellophane. It was surrounded by detergent or 
24 scented dryer sheets. 
25 Q. What was the weight on that? Do you know? 
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1 A. Approximately 12 pounds. 
2 Q. Did the 12 pounds of marijuana that you found 
3 corroborate in your mind with this faint smell that you detected? 
4 A, Yes. Yes. It did. And it went along with the residue and 
5 the sage and the juniper. 
6 Q. All right. Officer, I'm going to show you what's been 
7 marked previously as Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if you'll 
8 identify that exhibit for me. 
9 A. Okay. This is what was hanging on the inside rearview 
10 mirror. To me, it appears to be some sage and juniper. 
11 Q. And I think you stated prior that you can distinguish the 
12 difference between the smell of sage and juniper with marijuana? 
13 A. I'm not a botanist, but it appears to be from a juniper tree 
14 and it appears to be a type of sagebrush. 
15 Q. It's been in your possession since of 20th of October of 
16 1997? 
17 A. Yes. It has. 
18 MR. LEAVITT: For the purpose of the suppression 
19 hearing only, I would move to introduce Exhibit 1. 
20 MR. ESPLIN: I have no objection. 
21 THE COURT: 1 is received. 
22 (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence). 
23 Q. BY MR. LEAVITT: Now, officer, I'm handing you what's 
24 been marked Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2 and I'll ask if you'll identify that for 
25 me. 
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1 A. This is what I believe to be marijuana residue fragment. I 
2 believe this dark one was found on the left side of the vehicle. 
3 Q. Now is that in the same form as when you originally found 
4 it? 
5 A. This one is. This was fragments. 
6 Q. Okay. And where did you find that? 
7 A. This was to the left in the carpet, the left side of the 
8 driver's seat. 
9 Q. All right. So, tell me what it is about Exhibit 2 that made 
10 you believe that that was marijuana? 
11 A. It appeared to be burnt marijuana residue. 
12 Q. And what did you base that on? 
13 A. My experience over the years of observing it in various 
14 states: burnt, raw, fresh. 
15 Q. Let me ask you some questions about your experience. 
16 You've had 24 years of experience. 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Is that right? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And in those 24 years, you've seen marijuana, you've said 
21 on how many occasions? 
22 A. I haven't kept track. But it would have to be in the 
23 hundreds of times. 
24 Q. Uh-huh. You felt fairly confident that what you were 
25 seeing was marijuana. Is that right? 
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1 A. I believed it to be. Yes. 
2 Q. Has it been in your possession since the day of the 
3 offense? 
4 A. It has. 
5 MR. LEAVITT: You've seen it, haven't you? 
6 MR. ESPLIN: Well, I didn't have my microscope. But I 
7 think there's something in there. 
8 MR. LEAVITT: Okay. 
9 MR. ESPLIN: Examining it with the naked eye, I can't 
10 tell for sure. 
11 MR. LEAVITT: I'll move to admit Exhibit 2, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: It will be received. 
13 (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence). 
14 Q. BY MR. LEAVITT: I'm now showing you what's been 
15 marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 and ask you to identify that. 
16 A. This is the seed shell pod, skin, that was on the right 
17 front in the carpet. When I found it, it was kind of in a half shell. And 
18 putting it into the plastic, it just crushed because it's fragile. 
19 Q. So, it's in a different form now than it was on the date of 
20 the stop? 
21 A. It doesn't have the rounded appearance that it had when 
22 I pulled it out of the carpet. 
23 Q. Uh-huh. But you believe that to be a marijuana husk? 
24 A. I believe it to be a marijuana shell of the seed. In my 
25 experience in searching vehicles, you find a lot of this residue. I don't 
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1 know if it's just when they're making a joint, if it falls out, or if in smoking 
2 it, the seeds pop and throw the shells. But I've found a lot of it in 
3 various vehicles. 
4 Q. How many vehicles have you searched prior to October 
5 20th of 1997, if I could have you venture an estimate? 
6 A. I wouldn't want to guess. I would be maybe way off. It's 
7 in the hundreds. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. They have been consent searches or searches based 
10 on probable cause? 
11 Q. Have you found on many occasions husks such as these 
12 in the carpets of vehicles? 
13 A. I have. 
14 Q. Are you able to estimate how many times prior to the 
15 date of this stop? 
16 MR. ESPLIN: I object, your Honor. I think it calls for 
17 speculation, number one. Number two, it's not relevant to this case, 
18 whether or not this particular occasion. 
19 THE COURT: Well, I'll sustain the objection. 
20 MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, in State versus Poole, it goes 
21 to the officer's training and experience. I think if the officer is able to 
22 testify that he has seen these kinds of husks in the carpet of cars prior, 
23 I think that goes to the -
24 THE COURT: Well, he's told us he has. But, he's also 
25 told us that he just would be guessing. 
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1 MR. LEAVITT: Well, that was on a number of searches of 
2 cars, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Well, okay. If he can. 
4 MR. LEAVITT: If he can't answer it, I'll move it. 
5 THE COURT: All right. I'll permit it then. Go ahead. 
6 MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. 
7 THE WITNESS: I can't give you an exact number. But it's 
8 a highly reasonable number. 
9 MR. ESPLIN: And I object to that last comment after "I 
10 can't give you an exact number," and ask that it be stricken. 
11 THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection to that then. 
12 MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. Your Honor, we'd move to 
13 introduce Exhibit 3 for the purpose of this hearing. 
14 THE COURT: Any objection to 3? 
15 MR. ESPLIN: No. No objection. 
16 THE COURT: 3 is received. 
17 Q. BY MR. LEAVITT: Officer, why did you ask consent to 
18 search? 
19 A. Because I became suspicious that there might be 
20 marijuana. 
21 MR. ESPLIN: Well, I object to that, your Honor, as to why 
22 he did it. He can tell what he did. But as to his reasoning, that's not 
23 before the Court. The Court is to determine whether or not based on 
24 the facts he has a reasonable suspicion that there's contraband in the 
25 vehicle. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, I'll permit him to express what he 
2 relied on to do so. 
3 THE WITNESS: Could you ask me the question again? 
4 Q. BY MR. LEAVITT: Why did you ask consent to search? 
5 A. I became suspicious based on the odor that I believed 
6 was an odor of marijuana. As I say though, it was hard to pick it out, 
7 but it seemed like an odor of marijuana. 
8 They did have the juniper and the sage hanging on the 
9 mirror. 
10 MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. That's all I have. 
11 THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
12 MR. LEAVITT: I don't believe that the actual marijuana 
13 that was found is relevant to this. 
14 MR. ESPLIN: I'll get it. 
15 MR. LEAVITT: (Inaudible). 
16 MR. ESPLIN: No. That's fine. I'll get it. 
17 MR. LEAVITT: Okay. 
18 Q. BY MR. LEAVITT: I'm showing you what's been marked 
19 as Exhibit 4 and I'd ask you to identify that for me. 
20 A. This is the one that I was told had laundry in it. When I 
21 pushed down on it, it was solid and not like clothing would be. When I 
22 opened it up, this is what I saw. It was wrapped with the dryer sheets. 
23 The dryer sheets was on the top of it. 
24 I punched a small hole there and (inaudible) tested. It 
25 tested positive for marijuana. 
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1 Q. Thank you. It's been in your possession -
2 A. It has. 
3 Q. - since that day? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 MR. LEAVITT: I'd move for the admission of Exhibit 4. 
6 MR. ESPLIN: No objection. 
7 THE COURT: It will be received. Don't put it up here by 
8 me though. Marijuana really gives me a headache and I smelled it -
9 MR. ESPLIN: It has quite a strong odor, doesn't it, your 
10 Honor? 
11 THE COURT: - as soon as he carried the bag in. 
12 (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4 received into evidence). 
13 MR. LEAVITT: Easily smelled. Yes. It is. 
14 CROSS EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. ESPLIN: 
16 Q. Trooper Wilson, it's true that the sole reason you stopped 
17 this vehicle is because you didn't see a front license plate on the 
18 vehicle. Is that correct? 
19 A. Yes. I stopped the vehicle to check it. Like I say, Utah 
20 issues two plates. We do stop vehicles on that. There are many 
21 reasons why you stop. 
22 Q. I understand there might be other reasons, but the basis 
23 and justification for your stopping the vehicle, doing a traffic stop, which 
24 would be a level two encounter, turn your lights on, pulling the vehicle 
25 over, was because there was no front license plate on the vehicle. Is 
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1 that correct? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And it's true, is it not, once you got behind the vehicle you 
4 could see that this vehicle that had a Wyoming license plate on the 
5 vehicle? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Now, this was not a vehicle subject to the registration 
8 requirements of the State of Utah, it not being a vehicle that was 
9 registered in this state. Is that correct? 
10 A. Not subject to t h e -
11 Q. Registration laws of the State of Utah. 
12 MR. LEAVITT: Objection, your Honor. That calls for the 
13 officer to give a legal opinion. I don't think that that's his purpose or his 
14 expertise. 
15 THE COURT: Well, I'll permit the question. 
16 Q. BY MR. ESPLIN: Okay. Let me rephrase the question 
17 and make it a little easier. Was this vehicle then a vehicle which was 
18 registered in the state of Utah? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Does the fact that it was not registered in the state of 
21 Utah, does that make it illegal to travel on the roads of the state of 
22 Utah? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. And isn't it true that you did not know whether or not 
25 Wyoming requires, even though they may issue two plates, whether or 
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1 not they require a vehicle that's registered in Wyoming to display two 
2 license plates, a front license and a back license plate? 
3 A. It's been my experience that all vehicles generally do 
4 display the two license plates. 
5 Q. That's not my question. Listen to the question carefully. 
6 The question is: Do you know whether or not it's a violation of the law 
7 of the state of Wyoming that a vehicle that is issued two plates must 
8 display both a front and a rear license plate? 
9 MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I object. It's not relevant to 
10 this proceeding. 
11 MR. ESPLIN: It is relevant, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: I'll permit it. Go ahead. 
13 THE WITNESS: You've got me confused here. What's 
14 your point? 
15 Q. BY MR. ESPLIN: My question is this. Do you know that is 
16 a violation of a law of the state of Wyoming for a vehicle which may be 
17 issued two license plates to only display one rear plate? 
18 A. I do not know exactly if it is a violation of their law. I 
19 assume it is. 
20 Q. You do not. The question is: You do not know that it is. 
21 Is that correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And so the time you stopped this vehicle in Utah and it 
24 didn't have a front license plate on it, you did not know whether or not 
25 that was even a violation of the law of the state of Wyoming. Is that 
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1 correct? 
2 A. I assumed it was a violation of the law. That's why I 
3 stopped it. It is a violation in Utah if you're issued two license plates 
4 not to display a — 
5 Q. Well, I understand the law in Utah. I'm talking about 
6 Wyoming now. Did you know at that time? 
7 A. I assumed it was a violation of the law. 
8 Q. But you did not know? 
9 A. I assumed it. 
10 Q. Okay. This is a yes or no question. Did you know that it 
11 was a violation of the law of the state of Wyoming not to display a front 
12 plate? 
13 A. A violation of Wyoming law? 
14 Q. Yes. 
15 A. I did not. No. 
16 Q. Okay. Thank you. In fact, you do know from your 
17 experience that there are such states that don't require that front 
18 license plates be displayed. Is that correct? 
19 A. Correct. 
20 Q. And I take it your authority, as far as you understand it, 
21 would extend to the enforcement of the Utah rules of the road and 
22 particularly Utah registration requirements for vehicles? Would that be 
23 fair to say? 
24 A. I don't understand what you're saying. Say it again. 
25 Q. Your authority as a peace officer would include enforcing 
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1 the laws of the State of Utah relative to rules of the road and to enforce 
2 Utah registration requirements. Is that fair to say? 
3 A. Enforce registration requirements? Yes. 
4 Q. Of the State of Utah, correct? 
5 A. Registration requirements. 
6 Q. Are you telling me that you have authority as a Utah 
7 police officer to enforce registration requirements of another state, say 
8 the State of Wyoming? 
9 A. As a police officer, I have the right to stop a vehicle that 
10 does not have the registration. If that vehicles comes from another 
11 state, then I guess I am enforcing that because they are required -
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. - to have their registration to be operated in this state. 
14 Q. This vehicle was registered, was it not? 
15 A. Registered in Wyoming. 
16 Q. And you found no problem with the registration, did you? 
17 A. To my recollection, no. 
18 Q. Well, your notes. Do you want to read your notes? Your 
19 notes say the registration was okay. You found it was properly 
20 registered. There was no problem with registration. 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Was there? 
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. In fact, when you stopped the vehicle and you walked up 
25 to the vehicle after observing that the front bumper had been damaged 
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1 as you approached it, you then saw the front license plate displayed in 
2 the window of the vehicle on the dashboard, did you not? 
3 A. I did. 
4 Q. Okay. And at that point then you knew, did you not, that 
5 the vehicle at least had a front plate even if it wasn't displaying one, 
6 correct? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. So, what was your purpose from that point on to detain 
9 the individuals that were in the vehicle? 
10 A. To check to make sure he had a valid driver's license. To 
11 check for proof of insurance. 
12 Q. Did you have some reason to believe that the individual 
13 driving the vehicle may not have a valid driver's license because the 
14 front plate wasn't displayed? 
15 A. You lost me. 
16 Q. I said what about not having a front plate on the vehicle 
17 made you believe that this individual may not have a valid driver's 
18 license? 
19 A. I don't know. I just asked to see if he had a driver's 
20 license. 
21 Q. Isn't it true at that point, since this was a Wyoming 
22 vehicle, that you were going to stop and investigate for drugs? 
23 A. This was what? 
24 Q. Isn't it true that because this vehicle was a Wyoming 
25 vehicle, and you had stopped the vehicle, you were now going to see 
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1 if there were any drugs in the vehicle? 
2 A- As an officer of the State of Utah, I am sworn to uphold 
3 all the laws. Any vehicle I stop, I am looking for anything that might 
4 raise reasonable suspicion of any crime being committed. 
5 Q. So the answer would be yes? 
6 A- At the time I stopped the vehicle, I was looking at the 
7 front license plate not being displayed. 
8 Q. Okay. And you saw the front license plate? 
9 A. When I walked up to the car. 
10 CL Okay. Now, from that point, once you knew there was a 
11 front license plate to the vehicle and you could see why it wasn't on the 
12 vehicle, because of the damage to the bumper, you knew that, right? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. From that point on, were you then focusing on determining 
15 whether or not there were any drugs or contraband in that vehicle? 
16 A- At that time, I told him that I believe they needed to 
17 display it. They had two plates. 
18 Q. That's not my question. My question was: At that point 
19 did you make a determination that you were going to search that 
20 vehicle or look in that vehicle to determine if there was any further 
21 violations of law, such as the carrying of controlled substances? 
22 A. At that point, in my mind I am smelling the odors. "Now is 
23 this marijuana I'm smelling?" 
24 Q. No. I'm talking before you even talked to the driver. I 
25 mean, you've walked up. You're up at the vehicle. You see. As you 
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1 walk up to the vehicle, if you will recall, you said you saw the license 
2 plate and it was sitting on the dashboard. But at that point as far as the 
3 reason you stopped the vehicle, you know that it has a front license 
4 plate. I understand then at that point you don't have any reason to 
5 believe that it's not registered properly based on what you've seen. Is 
6 that correct? 
7 A. Not necessarily. 
8 Q. Did you look at the rear license plate as you were 
9 following the vehicle? 
10 A. I did. 
11 Q. Did it have a bumper decal on the vehicle showing that 
12 the license plate was current, the registration was current? 
13 A. The tag on that plate showed current. 
14 Q. Okay. What I'm saying, what at that point did you have, 
15 what reasonable (inaudible) suspicion did you have that this driver was 
16 violating any law at that point? 
17 A. At that point, I asked for the registration to verify that that 
18 license plate actually belonged to that car. There's a lot of people that 
19 put plates from other vehicles on cars, improper registration. 
20 Q. Did you have any reason to believe, any (inaudible) 
21 reasonable suspicion that this car was a stolen car at that point? 
22 A. In the past, we have got cars that are just displaying -
23 Q. I'm not talking about in the past. I said did you at that 
24 point think this particular car - what about this particular car that led 
25 you to believe this might be a stolen car? 
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1 A. The fact it didn't have the front plate displayed. 
2 Q. I'm talking about you've seen that the front plate is there, 
3 you've seen that the front -
4 A. The front plate wasn't mounted where I believed it should 
5 be mounted. 
6 Q. Didn't you say there was damage to the front bumper? 
7 A. Yes. That's right. 
8 Q. Didn't that satisfy your curiosity as to why there wasn't 
9 a front plate on there? 
10 A. I don't believe it did and I don't think it would satisfy 
11 anybody's curiosity. 
12 Q. So, you're telling us then, Trooper Wilson, that you were 
13 not then at that point focused on trying to determine whether or not 
14 there was some other violation of the law that these individuals might 
15 be involved in other than not just having a front plate on their vehicle? 
16 A. I'm trained when you approach a car, you're looking for 
17 all aspects. And when you talk to the people, you're looking for all that 
18 is there. 
19 Q. Okay. Now, you have indicated that at some point you 
20 became suspicious of a possibility that there might be contraband. At 
21 what point was that? 
22 A. At the point where I'm talking to the occupants where I'm 
23 standing by the driver's side of the vehicle. At that point, I can see the 
24 license plate on the dash. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. I can also see the juniper. I'm also getting what I believe 
2 is an odor of marijuana. 
3 Q. I believe you testified earlier that you were not sure that 
4 you were smelling marijuana because the smell is masked with other 
5 smells? 
6 A. That's correct. It's kind of hard to identify it sometimes. 
7 Q. Okay. So, you weren't sure. You thought you possibly 
8 smelled marijuana, correct? 
9 A. I thought I was smelling an odor that I believed was 
10 marijuana. 
11 Q. That you thought might be? 
12 A. Possibly. 
13 Q. And did at that point ask to search the vehicle? 
14 A. I believe I got the driver in my vehicle and at that point 
15 I told him of my suspicions. 
16 Q. Did you advise him of any Miranda rights he might have 
17 at that point? 
18 A. No. I didn't. 
19 Q. Why not? 
20 A. He was not under arrest. 
21 Q. He was detained, was he not? 
22 A. He was detained in the scope of the traffic stop. 
23 Q. But, you had completed your traffic stop, hadn't you? 
24 A. I was writing him a warning citation for failure to display 
25 a front license plate. 
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1 Q. Okay. And you had written him the warning citation. 
2 Were you going to let him go at that point? 
3 A. I gave him back his material and asked him if I could take 
4 a quick look there. Like I say, he kind of hesitated and said yes or "if 
5 you have to" or something. 
6 Q. Did you tell him at that point that "I suspect that you've got 
7 marijuana in the vehicle and I want to take a look."? 
8 A. I told him that I believed I was smelling the odor of 
9 marijuana. 
10 Q. And did you tell him that he had a right not to give you any 
11 information about that situation? 
12 A. I did not Mirandize him. No. 
13 Q. Did you tell him he was free at that point since you had 
14 finished writing the traffic citation, that he was free to leave? 
15 A. I had given him back all of his information. 
16 Q. But did you tell him he was free to leave? 
17 A. I didn't say, "You're free to leave." 
18 Q. Had you turned off the overhead lights on your vehicle? 
19 A. I had the overhead lights on for traffic safety. 
20 Q. Okay. And the overhead traffic lights are a signal to stop 
21 your vehicle (inaudible), are they not? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And he didn't give a full blown consent exactly, did he? 
24 said, "If you have to." Did you tell him, "Well, I don't have to. It's your 
25 choice."? 
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1 A. I don't recall the full details there. 
2 Q. Well, it's true you didn't tell him he did not have to submit 
3 to the search, isn't it? 
4 A. No. I did not tell him he did not have to submit to it. 
5 Q. The smell of marijuana that you claimed to have smelled, 
6 you said you couldn't distinguish whether or not it was the smell of 
7 burnt marijuana or fresh marijuana. Is that correct? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. They have a very distinctive different smell, don't they? 
10 A. They do at times. Yes. 
11 Q. Well, at anytime, don't they? 
12 A. Yeah. Burnt marijuana by itself smells and raw marijuana 
13 by itself. But when you've mixed the two and then you have air 
14 fresheners mixed with them and you have sagebrush and juniper -
15 Q. I'm just talking about the two different smells. 
16 A. Yeah. If you h a d -
17 Q. There's -
18 A. — pure marijuana here, burnt marijuana over there, yes. 
19 They do have different odors. 
20 Q. Okay. A long story short. You went ahead and with 
21 whatever permission you thought you had or you obtained, you looked 
22 in the front of the vehicle and you found these exhibits here, which you 
23 immediately identified as being marijuana residue -
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. - or substance. No question in mind about it? 
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1 A. There's a possibility it may not be. It could be a seed of 
2 something else. 
3 Q. It could have been something else? 
4 A. It very easily could be. 
5 Q. But, you took it to be marijuana. At the time, you were not 
6 sure that it was marijuana? 
7 A It appeared to me to be the husk of it. It has not been 
8 analyzed. It possibly could be just another seed husk. 
9 Q. And that's all you found at that point, correct? 
10 A. At that point. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. Plus the odor. 
13 Q. Is it not true that you felt that whatever consent you had 
14 was limited to searching the front seat of the vehicle? 
15 A. I believe I told them that I would just look in that front 
16 part. 
17 Q. So, at that point when you looked in the front, you were 
18 trying to justify searching the vehicle further, weren't you? 
19 A. I was looking in the vehicle to see what I could find. 
20 Q. And these items here like as small as that, it's possible 
21 that they could be in a vehicle, have been there for weeks, months? 
22 A. It's a possibility. 
23 Q. Without the passenger or driver knowing whose they were 
24 or even knowing they were there, correct? 
25 A. Correct. 
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1 Q. Now, to make a long story short, you did search the rear 
2 of the vehicle. And is it true that you searched - you indicated that you 
3 found some bags there, correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And isn't it true that the two bags you searched had 
6 clothes in them? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Personal possessions? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And isn't it also true that you searched the bag that Mr. 
11 Friesen identified as being his bag and in that bag you found nothing 
12 but legitimate items: clothes and other personal things? 
13 A. Yes. There was a pocketknife found that did appear to 
14 have marijuana residue on it. 
15 Q. In whose bag? 
16 A. And I would have to look at my notes on that one and 
17 probably on the back of my ticket notes. It might be in the inventory. 
18 Q. You found a black leather bag, correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Isn't that the bag that was identified as belonging to Mr. 
21 Friesen, my client? 
22 A. I believe it is. 
23 Q. Wasn't it in the dark blue travel bag, a turquoise bag, that 
24 you found the knife that had the marijuana residue on it? 
25 A. Is that what the report says? 
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1 Q. Well, I'm referring to your supplemental fact sheet, 
2 evidence property seized. Halfway down it says: "Small travel, dark 
3 blue bag with tan trim, red handled pocketknife and one small scale." 
4 A. Yes. That's correct. 
5 Q. Okay. And what's been received as State's Exhibit 4, 
6 this bag was also found, correct? 
7 A. In the rear of the vehicle. Yes. 
8 Q. And did you find any clothing or identification attached to 
9 that bag and connected with that bag, an indication it belonged to the 
10 driver, Mr. Friesen? 
11 A. The name is on the tag and I forget which one of their 
12 names is there. 
13 Q. Okay. I'll show you this tag her. And you're referring to 
14 a Delta Airlines tag. Let me get it here so that the judge doesn't smell 
15 this. Hold your nose, judge. 
16 A. Heath Sultan. 
17 Q. Heath Sultan. That would be the co-defendant, correct? 
18 A. Yes. Correct. 
19 Q. And isn't it true that in your conversation with Mr. Friesen, 
20 he indicated to you that his bag was the leather bag and this was not 
21 his bag? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 MR. ESPLIN: That's all the questions I have. 
24 THE COURT: Redirect, counsel? 
25 /// 
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1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. LEAVITT: 
3 Q. Officer, how quickly after you've had the window rolled 
4 down did you smell the odor of marijuana? 
5 A. Just initially when they rolled the window down, as I 
6 reached or bent over to talk to them and then off and on during the 
7 conversation. 
8 Q. The first moment that you smelled that marijuana, is that 
9 when your traffic stop would have changed into a possible drug 
10 investigation? 
11 A. When I become suspicious of the possibility of marijuana 
12 there because I believed that's what I was smelling. 
13 Q. So, would it be safe to say then that after you determined 
14 that they had a front plate, that you were not only looking for a bad 
15 license but also suspicious about drugs at that point? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. Nothing further. 
18 THE COURT: Anything else? 
19 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. ESPLIN: 
21 Q. I thought I asked you the same question and you said that 
22 you just wanted to check out the registration. That was wrong then? 
23 A. I believe what you said is that when I stopped that car, I 
24 was looking for drugs. 
25 Q. I said, "After you stopped the car." My question was this. 
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1 A. Well, then I misunderstood. 
2 Q. Okay. Let me ask it again to make sure I'm clear. After 
3 you stopped the car and you observed the rear license plate and saw 
4 that it was properly registered and current, you walked up to the driver's 
5 side of the vehicle, you saw the license plate on the front there, -
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. - my question is, at that point were you suspicious that 
8 there was drugs or activity and going to check that out? 
9 A. I can't remember at what point they rolled the window 
10 down, if they had rolled the window down prior to me seeing the license 
11 plate. 
12 Q. But, you don't recall when that was? 
13 A. I walked up to the door, the individual. The window was 
14 down and I see the license plate. This has all happened 
15 simultaneously. 
16 MR. ESPLIN: No further questions. 
17 MR. LEAVITT: Nothing else, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: You may step down. You may call your 
19 next witness. 
20 MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, part of the defendant's motion 
21 is to suppress based on a lack of nexus or connection to the drugs. 
22 It's the State's view that that's a jury question or a 
23 question of fact and it doesn't go to the suppression of evidence. 
24 I've got the co-defendant in the case who is here and can 
25 testify that Mr. Friesen was 100 percent part of the transaction if that's 
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1 necessary for purposes of suppression. I don't believe that that's a 
2 question for a suppression. I really think that's a jury question for them 
3 to decide. 
4 MR. ESPLIN: It's up to him what he wants to put on, your 
5 Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I think you'd better put it on, counsel. 
7 MR. LEAVITT: We'll call Heath Sultan, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: If you'll come forward, please. If you'll 
9 raise your right hand, the clerk will administer an oath to you. 
10 THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
11 you are about to give in this case now pending before the court will be 
12 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. I do. 
14 THE COURT: Be seated in the witness chair, please. 
15 MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I'd state for the record that 
16 Mr. Sultan will be pleading guilty to the third degree felony of simple 
17 possession of marijuana, that in the event that something were to 
18 happen to this plea bargain, the State would not hold anything he says 
19 today against him at the time of his trial. 
20 THE COURT: All right. 
21 HEATH JOHN SULTAN 
22 having been called and sworn 
23 testifies as follows: 
24 /// 
25 /// 
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1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. LEAVITT: 
3 Q. Please, tell us your name, sir. 
4 A. Heath John Sultan. 
5 Q. And do you know Clark Friesen? 
6 A. Yes. I do. 
7 Q. How? 
8 A. I met him in Jackson, Wyoming. 
9 Q. How long ago? 
10 A. I guess about a year ago. 
11 Q. What was the nature of your relationship? 
12 A. Friends. 
13 Q. Do you get together often? 
14 A. Whenever we just happen to shoot pool together and 
15 whatnot. 
16 Q. Were you engaged in drug activity together up in 
17 Wyoming? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Uh-huh. Did you go with him on a trip in October of 1997? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Can you tell me what the purpose of that trip was? 
22 A. To go to Arizona to meet up with a friend and purchase 
23 marijuana. 
24 Q. Okay. Did Mr. Friesen go with you on the trip? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Did he have any involvement in that transaction? 
2 A. Yes. He did. 
3 Q. Please, explain what that was. 
4 A. He wanted to share in the sale of the marijuana. 
5 Q. All right. When did he become aware the purpose of the 
6 trip was to purchase marijuana? 
7 A. At the start of the trip? 
8 Q. At the start of the trip? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And was he present when you purchased the marijuana? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Who purchased it? You or him? 
13 A. We both did. 
14 Q. Okay. Did you use his money as well? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. How much did you pay for it? 
17 A. To tell you the truth, I can't quite recollect. 
18 Q. Do you recall the events of the day of your stop, October 
19 the 20th, 1997? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Uh-huh. When you were stopped, do you recall the 
22 officer telling you that he smelled marijuana? 
23 A. Yes. I do believe, but the odor was strictly cigarettes. 
24 That's the fact of the matter. 
25 Q. But, there was a lot of marijuana in the Ford Escort. Is 
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1 that right? 
2 A. Correct. 
3 Q. Uh-huh. And the raw marijuana in the bag, the odor 
4 emanated inside the Ford Escort. Is that right? 
5 A. No. Actually at that time, it didn't. I think Trooper Wilson 
6 has excellent perception of human characteristics and nervousness and 
7 anxiety. I don't think he actually smelled any marijuana at all. 
8 Q. Uh-huh. Now, did he ask consent to search? 
9 A. He asked Clark. He didn't ask me. He told me that he 
10 had gotten consent to search from Clark and then he wanted to search 
11 the vehicle. I never gave consent to search the vehicle. 
12 MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. That's all I have. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Esplin? 
14 CROSS EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. ESPLIN: 
16 Q. You indicated that you went to meet up with a friend down 
17 in Arizona. Is that correct? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. Was that your friend? 
20 A. Yes, sir. 
21 Q. And what's his name? 
22 A. Jeremy allegedly. 
23 Q. Pardon? 
24 A. Allegedly his name is Jeremy. I met someone down there. 
25 If he told me his name was Jeremy, I'd take his word for it. But his 
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1 name is Jeremy. 
2 Q. You don't know the last name? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Had you met this individual before? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And so you had been down there before? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. How many occasions have you gone down to Arizona? 
9 A. Twice. 
10 Q. And was this the second time or the third time? 
11 A. This was the third time. 
12 Q. Third time. Isn't it true that while you were there, you had 
13 money wired down to you to purchase the marijuana? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And do you recall how much money was wired to you? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Who wired that money to you? 
18 A. A friend of mine. 
19 Q. What's his name? 
20 A. I don't recollect. 
21 Q. You don't remember his name? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. He's not that good of a friend? 
24 A. Not anymore. I haven't talked to anyone in Jackson since 
25 I left there and honestly I don't remember. 
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1 Q. Did he have a first name? 
2 A. Yes. I'm sure he has a first name. 
3 Q. But you don't even remember his first name? 
4 A. No. I don't. 
5 Q. How much money did this individual wire down to you? 
6 A. I don't recollect. I think most of it was actually for 
7 traveling expenses. I don't think it was to purchase marijuana. 
8 Q. But you don't remember? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. How did you contact this Jeremy? 
11 A. I paged him. 
12 Q. You had his pager number? 
13 A. Uh-huh. 
14 Q. How much money did Mr. Friesen give you? 
15 A. I don't recollect. 
16 Q. You know he gave you some money? 
17 A. Yes. It was a hodgepodge of money that was given to me 
18 by other people in Jackson and that's the reason I don't recollect who 
19 sent me what money and who it was or how much money Clark put in. 
20 It wasn't like a big drug deal where I'm going to go get a bunch of pot 
21 and be the big dealer. It was a bunch of people who wanted to get 
22 marijuana for their own personal use and were kind of donating money 
23 to get this and we were bringing it back. 
24 Q. You were kind of the guy who was gathering the money 
25 up. Is that correct? 
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1 A. Yeah. It was my connection. Yes. 
2 Q. Clark didn't have any connection down there? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. And this vehicle that you were riding in, the Ford vehicle? 
5 A. Uh-huh. 
6 Q. That was one that you had borrowed? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. Had you smoked any marijuana in that vehicle on that 
9 trip? 
10 A. Absolutely not. 
11 Q. When you say that the trooper smelled marijuana, when 
12 he said he smelled marijuana, you doubt that it did? 
13 A. I think it's impossible that he smelled marijuana because 
14 I the entire trip had checked to see if the car smelled like marijuana and 
15 I didn't smell anything whatsoever and I've smoked pot since I was four 
16 years old. So, I'm pretty familiar with the smell. 
17 Q. You're kind of familiar with it? 
18 A. Yeah. 
19 MR. ESPLIN: That's all the questions I have of this 
20 witness. 
21 MR. LEAVITT: Nothing further. 
22 THE COURT: You may step down. 
23 MR. LEAVITT: The State rests, your Honor. 
24 MR. ESPLIN: I do have one more question, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 Q. BY MR. ESPLIN: Is this your bag? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 MR. ESPLIN: No further questions. 
4 MR. LEAVITT: The record ought to reflect that the 
5 question referred to Exhibit 4, your Honor. 
6 MR. ESPLIN: Yes. Sorry about that. 
7 THE COURT: It may. 
8 Okay. Mr. Esplin, any witnesses? 
9 MR. ESPLIN: We don't intend to call any witnesses at 
10 this time, your Honor. 
H THE COURT: Very well then. Any argument or do you 
12 wish to submit it on written memorandum? 
13 MR. ESPLIN: I think I would like to submit it in brief, your 
14 Honor. I think it's an issue of (inaudible) jurisdiction. I think it needs to 
15 be addressed. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. ESPLIN: I would like to address one issue as far as 
18 the time on that, your Honor. 
19 We do have a trial date set in this matter for the 23rd of 
20 March. 
21 I have a conflict on that date that is fairly significant to me. 
22 It's more significant to my wife because she has high anxiety and takes 
23 Valium when she leaves and I usually have to fly to guide her on and 
24 off the plane. So, I would request that the Court maybe wait until the 
25 ruling on the motions and then reset the matter if necessary for trial 
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1 depending on what the ruling is. 
2 THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
3 MR. LEAVITT: No. 
4 THE COURT: All right. The trial date will be vacated and 
5 to be reset if necessary upon the Court's ruling and the suppression 
6 motion. 
7 How long do you need to get your memorandum in? 
8 MR. ESPLIN: I could submit mine by the 13th, about two 
9 weeks, your Honor, is that's appropriate. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. The 13th of March. 
11 MR. LEAVITT: Can I have two weeks after that, your 
12 Honor? 
13 THE COURT: All right. That would be the 27th of March. 
14 All right. If you'll have them in and then as soon as -be 
15 sure you courtesy copy me so that I get them in Provo. 
16 MR. ESPLIN: Okay. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. ESPLIN: Thank you, your Honor. 
19 MR. LEAVITT: May we withdraw the exhibits, your 
20 Honor? 
21 THE COURT: Yes, please. Especially the one. You've 
22 given me a headache now for the rest of the day. 
23 oOo 
24 
25 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH) 
: ss. 
County of Utah ) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do 
hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my direction from the 
transmitter records made of these meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and contains all of the 
evidence and all matters to which the same related which were audible 
through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the record, and 
therefore, the name associated with the statement may not be the 
correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 28th day of August, 1998. 
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February 24, 2000 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HBTAfTCOUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 971400205 
DATE: June 2,1998 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: David SturgUl 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having 
received and considered the Motion and a supporting memorandum, the Court hereby grants the 
Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
On or about October 20, 1997, UHP officer Charlie Wilson observed Defendant 
traveling northbound on 1-15. The officer noticed Defendant's vehicle did not have a front license 
plate, and decided to pull Defendant over. Before the officer signaled to Defendant to stop, he 
observed a Wyoming license plate displayed on the rear bumper of Defendant's vehicle. 
The officer testified at the preliminary hearing that the only reason he stopped 
Defendant was because of the missing front plate. He testified that he knew some states did not 
require a front license plate, but was not sure of the Wyoming requirement. The officer testified 
that he "assumed" Wyoming required two license plates since he had seen other Wyoming cars 
display both front and rear plates. 
The officer made contact with Defendant and was provided a valid driver's license and 
vehicle registration. At that point, the officer testified that he detected the odor of marijuana. 
The officer asked Defendant for consent to search his vehicle, to which Defendant reluctantly 
responded "if you have to." The search eventually produced a 12 pound bag of marijuana. 
60 
Opinion of the Court 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated [.]" U.S. CONST, amend IV; see also UTAH CONST, art. I, § 
12. The concern of the Fourth Amendment is against Unreasonable" or unjustified searches and 
seizures--"reasonable" searches and seizures are constitutionally valid. Although the expectation 
of privacy in a vehicle is less than that of a home, "one does not lose the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
In Utah, a peace officer may stop and question a person, without violating the Fourth 
Amendment, "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, 
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994) 
{quotingUnited States v, Place, 462 U.S. 696,702-.03 (1983)). 
In this case, Officer Wilson testified at the preliminary hearing that the only reason he 
stopped Defendant was because of the missing front license plate. He admitted that he wasn't 
sure whether vehicles registered in Wyoming were required to display front plates. He "assumed" 
they were because he had observed other Wyoming vehicles with front plates. The officer's 
"assumption" does not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal 
activity. A number of lawful reasons could have existed to explain the absence of a front plate-
one being that Wyoming law does not require them. 
The State cites Utah Code Annotated § 41-1A-1305. That section provides that it is a 
Class "C" Misdemeanor for any person to "operate on any highway of this state any vehicle 
required by law to be registered without having license plates or plate securely attached." The 
State argues that the statute does not exempt vehicles licensed in other jurisdictions. Assuming 
the State's interpretation of the statute is correct, that does not cure the officer's "assumption" of 
Wyoming's license plate requirement. The officer noticed Defendant's vehicle was registered in 
Wyoming before he pulled him over. At that time, the officer did not know whether Wyoming 
vehicles were required to display both front and rear license plates. Clearly, the officer cannot 
enforce a law that he merely "assumed" existed. Officer Wilson should have discontinued his 
pursuit of Defendant and allowed him to proceed without interruption. 
2 
The State claims "[c]learly the faint smell of marijuana gives rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that there was marijuana in the car[.]" While this may have justified a further inquiry of 
the driver after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must be present at the time of the stop and 
must be the reason for the stop. In this case, no reasonable or articulable suspicion existed to 
justify the stop. Furthermore, the unjustified stop negates any subsequent consent to search 
Defendant's vehicle. 
The bag of marijuana discovered in Defendant's vehicle was derived by exploitation of 
an impermissible stop. Because none of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply, the 
evidence will be suppressed. 
Order 
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 1998. 
cc: David 0. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney 
Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant 
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 0 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
CLARK ROY FRIESEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
| CASE NO. 971400205 
DATE: August 18, 1998 
1
 JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: Dave Backman 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Suppression and to Supplement the Record. The Court sees no reason to reconsider the decision 
to suppress evidence. Mr. Esplin's stipulation that Wyoming law requires a front license plate has 
no bearing on the Court's decision since it does not change the fact that the officer assumed and 
did not know that Wyoming requires two license plates. Having received and considered the 
Motion and the stipulation, the Court hereby denies the Motion. 
DATED t h i s / / day of August, 1998. 
*~ „ - * * ? ' 
cc: David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney 
Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant 
